Marriage and the Law: A Statement of Principles

Report, September 2006

How should family law treat marriage? In this report, a group of family scholars and legal scholars come together to acknowledge some key propositions about marriage and family law in the United States.Marriage is a key social institution, with profound material, emotional, and social consequences for children, adults, and society. As marriage weakens, fewer men are committed to family life, more women are saddled with the unfair burdens of parenting alone, and children's ties to both their parents (especially fathers) are weakened. Communities face increasing social and economic problems.

The most important benefits of marriage are not the sole creation of law. Social science evidence strongly suggests the prime way that marriage as a legal institution protects children is by increasing the likelihood that children will be raised by their mother and father in lasting, loving (or at least reasonably harmonious) family unions. Marriage in any important sense is not a creation of the State, not a mere creature of statute.

For marriage to create these benefits, it must be more than a legal construct. Creating a marriage culture that actually does protect children requires the combined resources of civil society,families, faith communities, schools, and neighborhoods, public policy, and the law in order to channel men and women towards loving, lasting marital unions. In recent years more Americans, and more family scholars, are taking marriage seriously.

Unfortunately, the recent trend in family law as a discipline and practice has been just the opposite. Family law as a discipline has increasingly tended to commit two serious errors with regard to marriage: (a) to reduce marriage to a creature of statute, a set of legal benefits created by the law, and (b) to imagine marriage as just one of many equally valid lifestyles. This model of marriage is based on demonstrably false and therefore destructive premises. Adopting it in family law as a practice or as an academic discipline will likely make it harder for civil society in the United States to strengthen marriage as a social institution.

As scholars and as citizens, we recognize a shared moral commitment to the basic human dignity of all our fellow citizens, black or white, straight or gay, married or unmarried, religious and non-religious, as well as a moral duty to care about the well-being of children in all family forms. But sympathy and fairness cannot blind us to the importance of the basic sexual facts that give rise to marriage in virtually every known society: The vast majority of human children are created through acts of passion between men and women. Connecting children to their mother and father requires a social and legal institution called "marriage" with sufficient power, weight, and social support to influence the erotic behavior of young men and women.

We do not all agree on individual issues, from the best way to reform unilateral divorce to whether and how the law should be altered to benefit same-sex couples. We do agree that the conceptual models of marriage used by many advocates are inadequate and thus contribute to the erosion of a marriage culture in the United States. We seek to work together across the divisive issue of gay marriage to affirm the basic importance of marriage to our children and to our society. We call on all the makers of family law,legislators, judges, the family law bar, and legal scholars who create the climate in which other players operate,to develop a deeper understanding of and commitment to marriage as a social institution.

A prime goal of marriage and family law should be to identify new ways to support marriage as a social institution, so that each year more children are protected by the loving marital unions of their mother and father.


http://center.americanvalues.org/?p=47

Know Your Civil Rights - Encounters With Law Enforcement or Child Protective Services

Published on FlexYourRights.org (http://www.flexyourrights.org)
At Your Door Scenario

In any given police visit to your home, with a few notable exceptions, the below rules will help protect your civil rights and improve your chances of leaving safely—so you don't have to be a legal expert to do the right thing.

1) Keep Your Private Items Out of View
This is common sense: Always keep any private items that you don't want others to see out of sight. Legally speaking, police do not need a search warrant in order to confiscate any illegal items that are in plain view. Bear in mind that, without a search warrant, police cannot enter you home under any circumstances. Still, if they see something suspicious in the proximity of your house, they could arrive with a warrant quickly and unexpectedly.

2) Do Not Let Them Enter
Exit the house and close the door behind you before greeting the officer. Regardless of what the officer says, there is no reason they need to be allowed into your home. Permitting an officer to enter your home is the equivalent of waiving your Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Without a warrant, police officers absolutely cannot enter your home without your permission or an emergency circumstance that could justify their entry.

3) Be Courteous & Non-Confrontational
If a police officer contacts you at your home, remain calm. Ask the Officer "How can I help you?" While you may not be pleased to have the police at your door, it is best to treat them as you would any other unexpected visitor. You have nothing to gain -- and everything to lose – by allowing hostilities to emerge.

Even if the officers are being belligerent it's always in your best interest to remain calm, courteous and non-confrontational.

4) Determine the Reason for the Officer's Visit
In many cases, the Officer's visit will have nothing to do with you personally. They may be seeking information about a crime committed in your neighborhood. In other instances, they may have concerns about activities taking place in your home. While you are under no obligation to answer police questions, it will often be possible to terminate the encounter simply by agreeing to turn down your music or bring your barking dog in from the backyard. If the police officer indicates that he or she would like to enter your home, you have become a criminal suspect and must be prepared to exercise your constitutional rights.

5) Just Say "No" to Warrantless Searches
WARNING: If a police officer asks your permission to search your home you are under no obligation to consent. The only reason he's asking you is because he doesn't have enough evidence to search without your consent. If you consent to a search request you give up one of the most important constitutional rights you have -- your Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

A majority of avoidable police searches occur because citizens naively waive their Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to warrantless searches. As a general rule, if a person consents to a warrantless search, the search automatically becomes reasonable and therefore legal. Consequently, whatever an officer finds during such a search can be used to convict the person.

Don't expect a police officer to tell you about your right not to consent. Police officers are not required by law to inform you of your rights before asking you to consent to a search. In addition, police officers are trained to use their authority to get people to consent to a search, and most people are predisposed to comply with any request a police officer makes. For example, the average motorist stopped by a police officer who asks them, "Would you mind if I search your vehicle, please?" will probably consent to the officer's search without realizing that they have every right to deny the officer's request.

If, for any reason you don't want the officer digging through your belongings, you should refuse to consent by saying something like, "Officer, I know you want to do your job, but I do not consent to any searches of my private property." If the officer still proceeds to search you and finds illegal contraband, your attorney can argue that the contraband was discovered through an illegal search and hence should be thrown out of court.

You should never hesitate to assert your constitutional rights. Just say "NO"!

6) Do Not Answer Questions without Your Attorney Present
There is no reason to worry that your failure to answer the officer's questions will later be used against you. The truth is just the opposite: Anything you say can, and probably will, be used against you.

In just about any case imaginable, a person is best off not answering any questions about his involvement in anything illegal. Assert your Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by saying these exact words: "Officer, I have nothing to say until I speak with a lawyer."

*Remember- If you do choose to answer any of the officer's questions, always be honest. Police are not easily tricked and will often become hostile if they feel disrespected. If you feel it is best not to answer truthfully, then don't say anything at all.

Source URL:
http://www.flexyourrights.org/at_your_door

US court found PAS met the Frye Test for Scientific Acceptability

from Richard Gardner

Notification of Judgement - Kilgore v. Boyd (U.S.)

I am pleased to report that on Wednesday, November 22, 2000, a family court in Tampa, Florida, ruled that the PAS had gained enough acceptance in the scientific community to satisfy Frye Test criteria for admissibility.

Richard Warshak and I both testified at the Frye hearing, which lasted two days. H Michael Bone was also involved in the case and provided valuable assistance. I believe that my website list (www.rgardner.com/refs) -- which includes approximately 100 articles on the PAS in peer-review journals and 38 courts of law that have recognized PAS -- played an important role in the court's decision.

The citation for use in future cases: Kilgore v. Boyd, 13th Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Fl., Case No, 94-7573, November 22, 2000.

I believe that this is the first case in which a court has so ruled. There is good reason to believe that this case will serve as a precedent. I am grateful to those who have sent me scientific literature references and legal citations. Please keep them flowing; the list can never be too long.

Richard Gardner

Extract from the judgement
from http://www.rgardner.com/pages/kg_excerpt.html

(Excerpt taken from Kilgore v. Boyd, Circuit Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Hillsborough County, Family Law Division. Case no. 94-7573, Div. D)

THE COURT: ... If I do have to apply a Frye test he has passed the Frye test. And I find that parental alienation syndrome has passed the Frye test in my courtroom, which is a Circuit Court Courtroom in the Family Law division, based on the evidence and the argument before me. The evidence and the argument before me, the testimony and the CV of Dr. Gardner, together with an excerpt of his writings. There was also proffered an article from the Florida Bar Journal which, quite frankly, I read when it came out and at the time I read it I placed some credibility in it. I'm also impressed by the fact that Dr. Gardner is cited in the footnote in at least one of the cases, I believe it's Schultz vs. Schultz hang on a second. Off the record a second. (There was a discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: It has also been proffered that the state of Texas gives it credence in its book of evidence and as Dr. Warshak testified the-- I cannot cite exactly the group, but it's some national psychologist organization, cites it approvingly and cites Dr. Gardner's writings approvingly in its child custody evaluation criteria.

Weighed against that was the testimony of Dr. Carter, who is a psychologist who seems to have no national criteria and whose opinion was bolstered by Dr. Whyte. I know Dr. Whyte, I have a very high opinion of Dr. Whyte's capabilities and quite frankly, based on their testimony I could see only that there only seems to be some sort of disciplinary turf battle between psychologists and psychiatrists, and just because psychologists don't approve of the parental alienation syndrome and because they cite that it's not in the DSM-IV doesn't mean that his test is not widely accepted in the relevant scientific community of child psychiatrists. Based on the evidence before me I have every reason to believe that it does.

Furthermore, Dr. Gardner's argument that it's not in the DSM-IV his argument is it's not in there yet because the DSM-IV hasn't been updated since 1994. Both of the examples cited, that is the fact that AIDS was widely discussed and treated and diagnosed before it was included in the DSM-IV, as was Tourette's syndrome, is persuasive.

The study by Dr. Gardner has been around since 1985, which is fifteen years. He testified that he's had some successful results, he's run some studies. His testimony was bolstered by Dr. Warshak, who is a psychologist and is also a full professor at a fairly prestigious university.

So based on the totality or that I find that even though I might not have to have the test meet the Frye criteria that it does meet the Frye criteria, and therefore I'm denying the former wife's motion to strike the testimony and evidence in the reference to parental alienation syndrome.

A few have asked: "What is the Frye Test?"

In the early 1920s, a man named James Frye was found guilty of murder on the basis of a new lie-detector test based on the theory that when a person lied, the systolic blood pressure would be elevated. In 1923, the Washington D.C. appeals court ruled that before a new scientific principle or discovery could be used as evidence in a court of law, it "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." The court ruled that the blood-pressure test had not gained such acceptance, and so Frye`s conviction was reversed. On the basis of the two-day Frye hearing in Tampa, the court ruled (primarily on the basis of the 100 peer-reviewed articles on the PAS and 38 court rulings in which the PAS had been accepted by the judge) that the PAS had gained general acceptance in the fields of psychology and psychiatry and can thereby be used as evidence in courts of law. Courts are free to accept evidence that has not passed the Frye test--and this has certainly happened with the PAS--but such acceptance is more easily appealable. Now such cases will be more difficult to appeal.
__________________________________

Notification of Judgement - Berg v. Perlow (U.S.

We've just received copy of the above judgement, Berg v. Perlow, Case No. CD 98-1285-FC, 15th judicial circuit in Palm Beach County Florida dated March 15, 2000, specifically recognizing Parental Alienation Syndrome, Some quotes include "the wife seeks sole parental responsibility and to eliminate any contact between husband and child based upon the Parental Alienation Syndrome". Husband diagnosed as psychopath, with copious quotes from DSM-IV. Father diagnosed as psychopath and child diagnosed with moderate to severe PAS by mental health professionals including Ellinger, Heller, Gardner and Bush. Court order includes such items as:

"The Husband...shall have absolutely no contact with the parties' child (now 8) until the child reaches age 14. No contact with the child forthwith shall include but not be limited to (the court will specifically reserve jurisdiction as to this issue as the husband will probably find a way to somehow circumvent this order, so that the Court will enter additional orders on behalf of the Wife so as to require strict compliance with this order) the following:

A. No telephone contact
B. No e-mail contact
C. No computer contact
D. No videos
E. No visitation
F. No visits at school
G. No records from school
H. No records from any health care providers
I. No contact indirectly by third parties on behalf of the Husband, whether they are relatives or not."

Other quotes include:

"The Court finds that the order of the Court in which the Wife should not disparage the Husband to the child is now becoming a detriment to the child. The wife needs to be as truthful to the child as possible taking into consideration the child's youth, but that the wife should advise this child of this Court's specific findings and why this Court has done what it has done, including but not limited to the husband's extensive background involving his deceitfulness, his lack of remorse, his arrests, his poor behavior control and impulsivity, his lack or empathy, and his total anti-social personality disorder".

The original article can be found here: http://www.fact.on.ca/Info/pas/pasnote.htm

The Empowerment of Children in the Development of Parental Alienation Syndrome

by Richard A. Gardner. M.D.
The American Journal of Forensic Psychology 20(2):5-29, 2002.

The parental alienation syndrome (PAS) is a disorder that arises in children in the context of child-custody disputes. It is the result of the combination of the programming (brainwashing) of children by the alienating parent and the children’s own contributions to a campaign of denigration against the alienated parent. A central factor operative in the children’s contributions is their empowerment, most often by the indoctrinators, but occasionally by the passivity of the targeted parent. In addition to these intrafamilial factors, extrafamilial factors are also operative, especially the legal system and mental health professionals. This article focuses on the ways in which all of these empowerment factors operate in the etiology, development, and perpetuation of the parental alienation syndrome.

_______________________________________________

The parental alienation syndrome (PAS) is a disorder that arises almost exclusively in the context of child-custody disputes (1-17). In this disorder, one parent (commonly referred to as the alienator, the alienating parent, or the PAS-inducing parent) induces a program of denigration against the other parent (commonly referred to as the alienated parent or the target parent). However, this is not simply a matter of "brainwashing" or "programming" because the children contribute their own elements to the campaign of denigration. It is this combination of factors that justifiably warrant the PAS diagnosis. When bona fide abuse/neglect is present, then the PAS diagnosis is not applicable. The primary symptoms of the PAS are:

1) Campaign of denigration

2) Weak, frivolous, and absurd rationalizations for the deprecation

3) Lack of ambivalence

4) The "independent-thinker" phenomenon

5) Reflexive support of the alienating parent in the parental conflict

6) Absence of guilt over cruelty to and/or exploitation of the alienated parent

7) Presence of borrowed scenarios

8) Spread of the animosity to the extended family and friends of the alienated parent

In this article, I focus on the empowerment of children that is typically seen in the context of the PAS. Empowerment of children is operative in each of the eight symptoms. Such empowerment is provided primarily by the alienating parent who encourages the children to vilify the target parent in such a manner that traditional rules of good conduct and respect are ignored. The empowerment may be aided by the alienated parent if that parent is passive by personality or becomes passive because of fear of worsening the situation if he (she) were to more actively attempt to constrain the PAS child. Furthermore, there are a variety of extrafamilial factors that contribute significantly to the child’s empowerment. The most important of these is the legal system at every level at which the family becomes involved. Here I will describe specifically how these empowerment factors operate in both the intrafamilial and extrafamilial realms.

The Role of the Alienating Parent in PAS Children's Empowerment

The primary source of PAS children’s empowerment is the programmer who empowers the children in the context of the campaign of denigration. The programmer writes the scripts, and the children recite them. There are repeated rehearsals. In fact, the programmers know well that "booster shots" are frequently required if the programming is to be maintained. They know well that healthy and benevolent input is the best antidote to the poisons injected into the child’s brain in the process of PAS indoctrinations. Empowerment can be seen in each of the eight primary symptoms of the PAS. Here I describe how this operates for each of the eight symptoms.

With regard to the campaign of denigration, the alienating parent may say to the target parent in front of the child:

"Why don’t you listen to her? "Can’t you see that she hates you and doesn’t want to be with you?"

"Can’t you hear what she’s saying to you? She’s saying that she finds you despicable."

"Have you no respect for your children’s wishes? She doesn’t want you at the school play. Can’t you get that into your thick skull?"

The child is empowered to mimic and parrot the programmer’s disparaging and denigrating messages, and there are no consequences to the child for the ensuing displays of disrespect and denigration. Rather, the most absurd rationalizations for the alienation are never questioned. Instead of confronting the child with the absurdity of these reasons, the alienator may make such comments as "I respect his (her) feelings" and "It’s important for her (him) to speak her (his) mind."

With regard to the weak, frivolous, and absurd rationalizations for deprecation, the child may give as reasons for never wanting to have contact again with the alienated parent: "He used to belch a lot at the dinner table," "He once said, `shit,’" and "She makes me go to bed too early." PAS children are not told by their alienators that their reasons are illogical and preposterous. They are exposed to such reactions in all other realms, e.g., "No, the earth is not flat," "Your sister did not make you hit your baby brother," and "Your teacher is not to blame for your not doing your homework." Yet, in the realm of the PAS professions, such constructive feedback is not given.

With regard to the child’s lack of ambivalence, children in a healthy home are taught that everybody is a mixture of things they like and things they do not like, even one’s parents. This principle is ignored when it comes to the comments about the victimized parent. PAS children are led to believe that there is one individual in this world who is an exception to that principle. The victimized parent may come to be viewed as the incarnation of all the evil that ever existed in the history of the world. The alienated parent may be compared to Adolph Hitler; Saddam Hussein; and Judas, the betrayer of Jesus Christ. Accordingly, any grief one can cause such a despicable individual is justified and supported. This contributes to the child’s empowerment.

With regard to the "independent-thinker" phenomenon, inculcating this notion is an intrinsic part of the programming. Alienators traditionally are accused of indoctrinating the campaign of denigration into the children. Typically they deny such participation, and the children pick up this defense and claim vociferously that their maltreatment of the victimized parent is all their own idea. They know that the programmer wants them to profess such independence, and they fear that if they do not do so, they may lose the affection of the alienating parent. This also contributes to their sense of empowerment. Hence, they profess that they are not passive weaklings parroting reflexively the campaign of denigration. Nor are they puppets or marionettes, automatically professing hatred for the victimized parent. Rather, they are intelligent, independent thinkers who have a mind of their own and have come to these conclusions free of any influence from the programming parent. This delusion, too, contributes to their sense of empowerment.

The reflexive support of the alienator also contributes to a sense of empowerment. This is in line with what is referred to in psychiatry as the identification-with-the-aggressor phenomenon. Weak people can gain strength by joining in with more powerful individuals, even people whom they recognize as noxious and despicable. The child basically subscribes to the principle: "If you can’t fight ’em, join ’em." The alienator is recognized as the more powerful force. Accordingly, the child reasons that joining the alienator will provide protection against being victimized like the targeted parent, obviously a stronger position. In contrast, to join the alienated parent may result in one’s being victimized oneself, obviously a weaker position.

With regard to the absence of guilt, PAS children are taught to be psychopathic. They exhibit neither sympathy nor empathy for the feelings of the targeted parent. This defect enables them to perpetrate their campaign of denigration without any feeling of low self-worth that is an intrinsic part of guilt. The absence of such guilt, then, facilitates implementation of the campaign of denigration and the associated empowerment that comes with it. The guiltless acting out of anger also produces a sense of empowerment, no matter how despicable the cause. Probably the best examples of this in the 20th century were Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Saddam Hussein.

The borrowed scenarios that are incorporated into the PAS campaign of denigration are the ammunition that enhance the efficacy of the campaign. The children use words that would not generally be found in the vocabulary of youngsters that age. They may not even know what the words mean, but they do know that their use ingratiates them to the programmer and can have the effect of justifying the alienation. A four-year-old girl says, "I never want to see my daddy again because he penetrated me." The child does not have the faintest idea what the word penetrated means. She obviously learned this term from her mother who has incorporated a sex-abuse accusation into the PAS campaign of denigration. The child recognizes that this statement is going to get significant attention from all the adults around her, especially the child protection people, the police, and the sex-crimes investigators in the prosecutor’s office. Never before did this little girl enjoy such notoriety. Such words indeed give the child power!

Last, when the campaign spreads to the victimized parent’s friends and extended family, the child becomes empowered to treat with disrespect and disparagement an ever-growing number of adults. The child who says to a loving grandmother over the telephone, "I hate you grandma. I never want to see you again" and then hangs up the phone knows that there will be no repercussions for such maltreatment of a grandparent. In fact, each time the child does this, the programmer provides support and even rewards. This empowers the child to "tell off" powerful adults. It provides a fulfillment of the fantasy of the little kid beating up all the big guys in the neighborhood or the single soldier, with one sword, fighting off a whole army.

The Role of the Alienated Parent in PAS Children's Empowerment

In most cases of PAS, the disorder is primarily the result of the programming of the children by the alienator. However, there are occasions when the victimized parent contributes to the development of the disorder. My experience has been that most alienated parents are true victims and are doing nothing to deserve the grief that has been visited upon them by their children’s PAS symptomatology. However, there are some, a small percentage, who unfortunately contribute to the children’s empowerment. My experience has been that passivity on the part of the alienated parent has been the most common factor. Such a targeted parent may be afraid to provide corrective confrontations or implement traditional disciplinary measures for their PAS children lest their responding anger intensify even further the campaign of denigration. The children’s responses may then become incorporated into their campaign of denigration, e.g., "He said that my mother wasn’t telling me the truth," "She said that I’ve been brainwashed by my father," and "He gave me time out, just because I wouldn’t talk to him all afternoon." Such a parent may also fear that such negative feedback will come to the attention of the court and be viewed by the judge as a violation of the court’s restriction from disparagement of the other parent to the children.

There are some who claim that victimized parents (especially men) have been "asking for it" and thereby deserve their victimization. This to me is the equivalent of saying that women who have been raped are generally "asking for it." There are some who claim that narcissism contributes to such victimization. Those who make this claim are usually basing their conclusion on clinical impressions. On occasion, they may refer to an MMPI report in which the word narcissism appears among the sea of other characteristics which the patient presumably exhibits on the basis of the test finding. My experience has been that such parents’ diagnosis of narcissism was not justifiable with the utilization of the more stringent criteria for narcissism to be found in DSM-IV (18). I am not saying that I have never seen a narcissistic PAS targeted parent. What I am saying is that it is not a common problem for them, especially with regard to their contribution to the PAS. But even if some of the victims are narcissistic, that does not justify the conclusion that they thereby justify being so victimized. Some claim that targeted parents contribute to their children’s hatred of them by their seemingly intrusive behavior and preoccupation with seeing their children. Those who view the situation in this way are generally insensitive to the plight of the alienated parent, whose frustration and impotent rage may be formidable. Their intrusiveness and obsessive preoccupation is a reaction to their exclusion, not the primary cause of it.

I have been seeing PAS children since the early 1980s. The only pattern that I have seen in which I can justifiably conclude that the alienated parent has contributed to the children's empowerment and campaign of denigration has been passivity. To date I have not seen any other factors. I am not claiming that other factors do not exist; I am only claiming that I have not seen them frequently enough to warrant my making any general statements about such contribution. It is this passivity, however, that facilitates the PAS children’s empowerment.

The Role of the Legal System in PAS Children's Empowerment

The parental alienation syndrome (PAS) is primarily a product of the adversary system. The system is based on the theory that the best way to find out "the truth," when opposing sides have different opinions on a particular issue, is for each side to present its position to an impartial party or tribunal (judge, group of judges or jury). Presumably, the truth will emerge from the presentation of the opposing arguments. The system was originally designed to determine whether an accused party did indeed commit the illegal act that was alleged to have been perpetrated. Although it may be a useful system for making decisions in that realm (and I have my doubts about that as well), it is clearly not applicable for finding out who is the better parent when they are involved in a child-custody dispute. Yet, that is the system within which such disputes are presumably resolved in the United States and many other countries. Elsewhere, I have described in detail the deficiencies of this system for this purpose (2, 6).

I have been actively involved in child-custody litigation since 1963, a span of approximately of 38 years. I am convinced that this method for resolving custody disputes does families more harm than good. One of my books is completely devoted to the psychologically detrimental effects on children and their parents of their embroilment in this system (2). I believe that if the courtroom were completely unavailable for the adjudication of such conflicts, and if the family were to have no other place to turn but themselves for resolution of these conflicts, that, on the whole, more good than harm would be done. Of course, there would be some children who would be completely unprotected from their warring parents and might be used as ropes in the parental tug of war. However, this number would be small compared to the much larger group of children who would be protected from the depravities of the adversary system. Furthermore, parents too would be better off. Although battling it out on their own is certainly psychologically traumatic, using the courtroom as the battlefield is far more traumatic.

Pertinent to this article is the empowerment that the legal system-- especially the adversary system--provides children, an empowerment that complements the empowerment provided by the alienating parent. It is common in such disputes for the judge to appoint a third attorney, an attorney who represents the child’s interests. Sometimes this person is referred to as the child’s attorney and sometimes as the guardian ad litem. Although the terms maybe be used synonymously, most often the courts make a sharp differentiation between the two roles.

The person who is designated as the child’s attorney functions in a manner very similar to the attorneys who are representing each of the parents. Such attorneys do not have unilateral access to the court. They cannot speak with the judge without the presence of the other attorneys. Furthermore, at the time of the trial, they may put witnesses on the stand and conduct both direct and cross-examinations in a manner similar to the parents’ attorneys.

In contrast, the guardian ad litem is the judge’s designee and has direct access to the judge. The guardian has free access to all parties, that is, attorneys from both sides and the parents, as well as the child. It is a freer and more flexible role. In the courtroom the guardian ad litem is less likely to be permitted to bring in witnesses and conduct examinations, although I have seen some limited permission to engage in such a role in the courtroom.

The Guardian Ad Litem

I am ambivalent about guardians ad litem and the utilization of yet another attorney in adversarial proceedings. Because of my preference for mediation, arbitration, and other methods of dispute resolution that do not involve adversarial proceedings, I am reluctant to support a program that invites yet another attorney into the battle. Besides the extra expense, it is likely that another attorney will just add to the intensity of the conflict. However, I have found that the guardian ad litem can be particularly useful to the impartial examiner (and even to an adversary evaluator) in the course of the evidence-gathering phase of the evaluation. The guardian ad litem can generally be relied upon to assist in obtaining documents that a parent might have been hesitant to provide or to enlist the court’s assistance in getting reluctant parents to cooperate in the evaluation. The guardian ad litem, even more than the impartial examiner, is allowed direct communication with the judge and can thereby speed the process of the evaluation and obtain information that might not be so easily acquired.

However, it is important that the judge and the attorneys (the people who are involved in choosing the guardian ad litem) be certain that the person chosen is familiar with the PAS. To select a guardian who is not familiar with the PAS increases significantly the risk that the PAS will become entrenched. Attorneys who serve as guardians in child-custody disputes must reorient themselves regarding what they have been taught in law school: that they must zealously support their client’s position, even if they have no conviction for it. Guardians ad litem must appreciate that their clients are children and their judgment regarding what is really in their best interests may be somewhat compromised.

A guardian ad litem who is not familiar with the PAS may cause serious psychological damage to children suffering with this disorder. A guardian ad litem who is not familiar with the causes, manifestations, and proper treatment of children with PAS may prove a definite impediment in the course of their treatment. The guardian who takes pride in supporting what children profess they want is likely to perpetuate the psychopathology of children suffering with PAS. The guardian must recognize that PAS children need to be forced into doing things that they profess they do not want to do. They must appreciate that PAS children want excuses to have contact with their alienated parent. Most PAS children secretly welcome excuses that will enable them to have contact with the alienated parent, especially when the disorder is in the mild and moderate categories. They need to say to the alienator; "I really hate going to visit, but I’m scared that if I don’t Mr. X or Ms. X (the guardian) will get us in trouble with the judge." In order to do this, the guardian must "switch gears" and unlearn certain principles learned in law school regarding being a zealous supporter of one’s client’s requests and demands. Guardians must be ever aware that the client is a child, not an adult.

And guardians must also be ever aware that the client is just not any child, but a child with a PAS. If these considerations are taken into account, then the guardian will be comfortable doing just the opposite of what the client requests. The guardian ad litem must appreciate that the children’s best interests are not served necessarily by doing what the child professes, but doing what is really best for the child. The two might not be the same. A competent and ethical guardian will say to the court:

"I do not believe that it is in the children’s best interests for the court to go along with their request that they have no contact at all with their mother (father). It serves their best interests that they be forced to see the alienated parent in spite of their protestations, even their vigorous and hysterical protestations."

Such a guardian must be comfortable with the children’s criticisms and must be willing to be used as the excuse for the children going to the allegedly hated parent:

"I really hate that lawyer. He says I must visit my father. I really hate my father. You know, Mommy, I love you, and I don’t want to go there, but he makes me go there."

In this way, the guardian serves as a vehicle for assuaging the child’s guilt over disloyalty to the alienator, disloyalty implied by any willingness to visit the targeted parent.

Guardians who do their work properly will help educate judges and attorneys who are not familiar with the PAS. They will impress upon the adversary attorneys and the court the importance of ordering the kind of special therapeutic programs necessary for the treatment of PAS children (13, 16). The guardian should then serve to help implement the special court-ordered treatment program. Sometimes the guardian can serve as an intermediary between the court-appointed neutral PAS therapist and the court. I am not recommending here that the guardian serve merely as a messenger. Rather, the guardian would clarify for uncooperative parents the legal consequences of their recalcitrance to facilitate visitation and add clout to the therapist’s warnings and threats.

The Child’s Attorney

My experience with guardians ad litem has been mixed: some do what is best for the children and ignore their PAS professions, but most reflexively support them no matter how pathological their demands. In contrast, my experience with children’s attorneys has been uniformly tragic (and I have no hesitation using that word). Without exception, they vigorously and zealously support their client’s position, ignoring the fact that their clients are PAS children whose claims are just the opposite of what is good for them, just the opposite of what is in their best interests. My attempts to get them to see that they are corrupting their clients, empowering them to a degree that is significantly pathological, falls on deaf ears. Typically, a six-year-old PAS client will say to the alienated parent over the telephone: "If you come here and try to take me to your house, I’m going to call my lawyer," "If you don’t let me go home right now, I’m going to call my lawyer," and "If you give me time out, I’m going to tell my lawyer." In testimony, I have spoken along these lines with regard to the children’s attorney and sometimes even about the guardian ad litem:

"I am sure that Ms. X would not support the children’s demands that they not go to school, not visit the pediatrician, and not take their immunization shots. I am sure that Ms. X would not support the children if they wanted to shoot their mother with a gun, poison her food, or throw their infant brother into the swimming pool. Yet, Ms. X is supporting vigorously the children’s desires to do equally self-destructive things--destructive to themselves and destructive to others--when she argues that the court should respect their desire not to see their mother."

All this generally falls on deaf ears because lawyers are so deeply committed to the notion that a lawyer must zealously support the client’s position. We see here an excellent example of the detrimental effects on children of the empowerment provided by the legal system. It is a form of corruption of young minds, a corruption that empowers them to not only wreak havoc on innocent alienated parents, but compromises themselves as well, because the deprivation of a loving parent cannot but produce significant psychopathology, both at present and in the future.

The Child Advocate

In recent years, the term child advocate has taken on a special meaning. Traditionally, the term referred to an attorney who served the children in the course of litigation. Some jurisdictions differentiate between the child advocate and the guardian ad litem; other jurisdictions do not. These differences sometimes relate to whether the individual is allowed to conduct cross-examinations in the courtroom. Recently, there has emerged a group of individuals, most often not attorneys, who refer to themselves as child advocates. These people may or may not have had formal training in any of the traditional mental health disciplines. They generally are those who wave the banner, "Believe the children," and take at face value everything and anything children say.

Child advocates gravitate, especially, to sex-abuse evaluations, where they hold stringently to the position that "children never lie," especially in the realm of sex abuse. They sanctimoniously preach that we should "believe the children," and they look down condescendingly on those who claim that children alleging sexual abuse should not necessarily be believed. A false sex-abuse accusation is a common spin-off of the PAS and so this position can be extremely detrimental in PAS situations when the likelihood that the accusation is true is very small.
1

My experience has been that some of these individuals are using their seemingly benevolent advocacy of children in the service of venting rage upon men, and they are, for the most part, derived from the group of overzealous women who have found this field to provide a wonderful opportunity for this outlet (19, 20). Others are poorly trained and/or simpleminded and believe that they are indeed joining a noble cause. Whatever the motivations of these individuals, examiners do well, these days, to be wary of engaging the services of someone whose primary label is "child advocate." To date, I have not seen one child advocate in the context of a child-custody dispute who has been useful to the children whose position they advocated. And this has been especially the case when a false sex-abuse accusation has emerged as a spin-off from the PAS. Rather, they have provided children with pathological empowerment and often entrench PAS delusions and even sex-abuse delusions (19, 21).

Judges

Judges play an important role in the empowerment of PAS children. Obviously judges have the power to delegate and transmit their power down to children via pathways that are easily traceable. For example, it is routine for judges to warn parents that they should strictly refrain from criticizing one another in front of the children. This admonition may often be verbally transmitted in the course of a custody hearing and it is routinely incorporated into court rulings. Although well meaning, this advice is misguided. All of us, whether or not our parents are divorced, should have as accurate a view as possible of our parents -- both their assets and their liabilities. Children tend to identify with and unquestioningly accept their parents’ characteristics. They operate on the principle: "If it’s good enough for them, it’s good enough for me." When young they swallow the whole package, so to speak, indiscriminately identifying with many qualities that are not in their best interests. As they grow older, healthy children learn to accept parental qualities that are desirable and tolerate or reject those that are not.

Subtle forms of denigrating communications to the children are quite common among PAS indoctrinators. They are ostensibly complying with the judge’s order not to criticize the other parent to the children. In fact, they may profess, somewhat sanctimoniously, "I told him that there are things about his father that I could tell him that might cause him to hate his father, but they’re too terrible to talk about, so I strictly refrain from mentioning them." A child returns home from a week’s visit with mother. The father asks, "So what did you do this week with your mother?" The child answers, "She took me to Disney World." One father responds, with a tone of excitement and a look of surprise on his face, "She took you to Disney World?" The message imparted is this: "You are certainly lucky to have had such a wonderful vacation." Another father responds with a tone of incredulity and a facial expression of disbelief, "She took you to Disney World?" The response implies that the mother is somehow stupid or depraved if she could choose such a vacation. We see here how the same words were used by both of these fathers, but obviously entirely different messages were communicated. The first gets across the message that the child is indeed lucky to have such a loving mother. The second gets across the message that God must have shortchanged this child to have given him a mother who would subject him to such an abominable vacation. There is no way that a judge’s order is going to effectively prohibit such communications. And if a judge believes that a supervisor is going to protect the children from such communications, then the judge is naïve. The supervisor will not only be unable to protect the children from many of the PAS indoctrinating communications, but will serve as an intrusive element that cannot but compromise the healthy elements in the relationship between the indoctrinator and the PAS child, programming notwithstanding.

My experience has been that it is rare for a PAS indoctrinator to comply with the judge’s order not to criticize one another in front of the children or criticize the other parent to the children. Overtly and covertly, they typically violate it. In fact, in all of my experiences with PAS families, I have never seen one indoctrinator who has been deterred by such an order. Nor have I seen such violating parents ever punished by a court for such violation. However, I have seen many situations in which the victimized parent will strictly comply with it. They not only fear that the court will sanction them for confronting the children with the programmer’s lies, but fear that their confrontations will be incorporated into the children’s campaign of denigration and add yet more ammunition to be used against them. Sometimes this failure to criticize the children relates to a general passivity problem on the part of the victimized parent. Elsewhere, I have elaborated on this possible contribution to the PAS on the part of the alienated parent (16). The net effect of this is that the children become free to indulge themselves in their vilification of the victimized parent. They know that the alienating parent will not comply with the court order to refrain from criticizing the alienated parent in front of and to the children. And they know also that such expressions of denigration will not be constrained or restricted by the alienated parent for the aforementioned reasons. We see here, then, how this misguided order contributes to the development and perpetuation of the PAS as well as the pathological empowerment of PAS children.

Another way in which judges contribute to the empowerment of PAS children results from their deep-seated reluctance to change child custody, even when PAS is clearly present. Indoctrinators who are primary custodial parents know well that judges are extremely reluctant to change the status quo, especially when it comes to custodial change. I am not claiming that judges never do this; I am only claiming that my experience has been that custodial change in PAS cases is uncommon, and victimized parents usually have a hard uphill fight to get the court to transfer custody to their homes. The courts believe the children’s PAS lies and delusions, comply with them, and thereby empower them. And the parade of mental health professionals will discourage the court from such transfer lest these "tender little souls" become upset. Indoctrinating parents know this well and this situation encourages them to continue with their indoctrinations. And this, then, gives alienators free reign with regard to the programming process and thereby empowers the children to continue denigrating the targeted parent even more.

A related phenomenon is the absolute refusal of judges to impose sanctions on PAS adolescents. Communities generally have facilities for incorrigible youngsters. Some are placed in psychiatric hospitals and others in juvenile detention centers. Yet I have never seen a case where such a disposition has been ordered for a PAS child, no matter how despicable the behavior. I generally do not recommend that such youngsters be placed in such centers for long periods. Rather, I am certain that a visit for an hour or two would serve to sober most of them up and reduce significantly their ongoing disparagement of the victimized parent.

PAS children need excuses to give the programmer for reducing and even refraining from their PAS campaigns. They need to say to the programmer: "I really hate going there, but I’d better go because the judge said if I don’t, he’ll put me in a juvenile detention center" or "I really hate him, but I’m only going there because I know the judge will punish you if I don’t." If the judge’s warnings are frivolous and empty, they will have no effect. If, however, the mother and the youngster know that the judge is serious about threats of repercussions, then change is likely to take place. Unfortunately, I have great trouble getting judges to provide meaningful threats, threats with conviction. I am often criticized for the use of the word threat. Similarly, I am often criticized for even mentioning the term juvenile detention center to these children. All of us need threats. If you do not pay your electric bill, they turn off the electricity. If you do not pay your mortgage, you may lose your house. There have to be consequences in life. People must be accountable. PAS children sidestep this important life principle, so important in a civilized society. They are encouraged to be uncivilized because they do not have accountability. Their empowerment corrupts them.

My experience has been that in about 10 percent of PAS cases, a false sex-abuse accusations emerges (3, 21, 22, 23). And such accusations provide children with enormous power. In the mid-1980s, when I first started to speak about this phenomenon, there was general incredulity on the part of judges. Over the years, courts have become increasingly aware of this common depravity. Although less likely to accept as valid such accusations, my experience has been that judges rarely dismiss entirely the accusation but, even when they find no evidence for sex abuse, will still recommend supervised visitation. One of the most famous examples of this is the Woody Allen case. The court did not find Woody Allen guilty of having sexually abused Mia Farrow’s daughter; however, supervised visitation was still ordered.

A judge who has a reputation for protecting us from perverts, who puts them behind bars if there is even the slightest suspicion that they have sexually abused our children, will generally be viewed with approval and gratitude. In contrast, the one who has allowed even one pervert to roam the streets may not be reappointed or reelected. Under these circumstances, judges will often take no chances. There are judges who have openly made statements along these lines: "If there is one scintilla of evidence, no matter how remote, that this person sexually abused a child, I will do everything in my power to remove him (her) from society." In the service of this goal, constitutional protections of due process are ignored. The principle of our founding fathers that a man is innocent until proven guilty is basically ignored. In these cases, a man is guilty until proven innocent. The principle that it is preferable that a hundred guilty men be set free than one innocent man be incarcerated is reversed to: rather a hundred innocent men be found guilty than one guilty person be allowed to go free. Such judges get positive feedback from hysterical parents and thereby enhance the likelihood of reappointment or reelection. One result of this is that little children become empowered to put adults in jail. Elsewhere, I have elaborated on this point (19).

The Role of Child Protection Services in PAS Children's Empowerment

Mention has been made of the false-sex-abuse accusation spin-off of the PAS. Essential to the success of such a maneuver is the child protection service. Although we certainly need child protection services (CPS), especially because child abuse (including sexual abuse) is quite common, there is no question that the people who work in such agencies are often overzealous and err on the side of concluding that the accused party is indeed guilty. Although things have progressively become better over the last 15 to 20 years, my experience has been that the people who work in such agencies are still likely to be overzealous and err on the side of concluding that the abuse took place. They still use anatomical dolls, body charts, and other diagrams that are sexually suggestive and contribute to the child’s making comments that lead to the conclusion that sexual abuse has taken place. And although they claim that they no longer use leading questions, all of the videotapes I have seen of their interviews (and I do not hesitate to use the word all) are replete with leading questions. Although CPS evaluators routinely profess that they do not use leading questions--because they know intellectually that they are supposed to claim that--they generally do not know what a leading question is and still provide questions that plant seeds and elicit sexual answers (24).

It is not simply naiveté that is operative here. The more such investigators conclude that sex abuse has occurred, the more demands they can make for money to support their services. Anyone who claims that these people are overreacting and that there are not as many sexually abused children as they profess is viewed as not being properly protective of abused children and may possibly have some kind of pedophilic tendencies him- or herself. Accordingly, a multimillion dollar, if not billion dollar, industry has grown. This industry has provided a powerful weapon for PAS indoctrinators. In fact, in the history of divorce conflicts, it is probably reasonable to say that no greater weapon has ever been placed in the hands of an angry parent than the sex-abuse accusation. The whole industry is out there that will send "gangbusters" to the house within minutes in order to take action against the alleged perpetrator.

Divorcing parents know well that murdering the hated spouse will generally result in formidable repercussions for the murderer. However, such an angry parent can easily bring about a state of living death for the hated spouse, within a few minutes, by simply picking up the telephone and calling the local child protection people. Even when the accusation is ultimately considered to be "unfounded," the stigma remains--often throughout life. What good parent would want their child to visit the home of another child whose parent was accused of sexual abuse?

The child protection workers empower children enormously. Many wave the flags "Children Never Lie" and "Believe the Children." Every utterance, no matter how preposterous is given credibility, especially if the utterance relates to sex abuse. People are taking meticulous notes and even videotaping these utterances, no matter how ludicrous and removed from reality. The child was never taken so seriously. The child never had so much attention. And all this creates pathological empowerment. All the child needs to do is to say a word about a "bad touch" or about how a parent "touched my private place" and everyone in the room stops and freezes. Immediately, with pencil and pad in hand, the comments are memorialized for posterity. Photocopies are duly made and these are distributed to lawyers, the court, therapists, and all other concerned parties. I have seen cases in which satanic ritual abuse was allegedly perpetrated. Weekends were spent with the child’s going around town pointing to the various sites where the satanic abuses allegedly took place. And it was not only the parents who accompanied the child but child protection people, the so-called "child advocates," and "experts" on satanical ritual abuse. It is rare for children to receive such empowerment. Elsewhere, I have elaborated on this problem (19).

The police, also, typically become involved. A child’s interrogation by police, prosecutors, and those in the sex-abuse units, may be somewhat frightening. However, the interviews are also enormously ego-enhancing. All these important and powerful people are paying dutiful attention to every bit of dribble that flows out of the child’s mouth. I have seen situations in which these people will give such children police badges and make them "junior cops" after providing their sex-abuse "disclosures." Again, more empowerment. I am not saying that all sex-abuse accusations are "dribble." What I am saying is that most, but not all, that arise in the context of child-custody disputes are false.

From the outset, the child is assured that the inquiry has nothing to do with any crimes he (she) may have committed. Rather, the child is told that he (she) is providing valuable assistance to the police in bringing to justice a pervert who, incidentally, happens to be the child’s own father, mother, stepfather or stepmother. The child comes to learn that the sex-abuse accusation can be a powerful weapon in its own right, and the accusation need not be initiated by the programmer. I have come across children who have said: "If you punish me, I’m going to call Mary Jones at Child Protection and tell her that you sexually abused me again." Unfortunately, this will work, and it may actually freeze the accused parent. The child knows that Mary Jones is likely to take seriously any accusation, no matter how preposterous. And Mary Jones may claim that the law requires her to initiate, yet once again, an investigation, even though she herself may have little if any conviction by then for the validity of the allegation. The sex-abuse "team" descends upon the home and the child enjoys enormous attention and notoriety. Once again, we see here how the child abuse industry provides these children with empowerment.

The Role of Therapists in PAS Children Empowerment

My experience has been that the vast majority of therapists have contributed formidably to the pathological empowerment of PAS children. Child therapists traditionally take the stance that they are more sensitive than others to the needs of children, more respectful than others of their desires, and are therefore more likely to provide them with the support for their professions and requests. A common problem here is that they often do this to the point where they lose sight of the injudiciousness of such "respect" and compliance. They often sanctimoniously profess that they really respect what children want, unlike parents and others in the world who do not really respect children. This holier-than-thou attitude often contributes to the empowerment of PAS children, especially their campaigns of denigration and often false sex-abuse accusations.

Some therapists take the position that their role is to support the position of the child no matter how injudicious. In the service of this principle, they blind themselves to the preposterousness of the professions of their child patients, even when they are as ludicrous as those often seen in a PAS campaign of denigration. And this, of course, contributes to their pathological empowerment. A common situation is the one in which the PAS programmer selects a therapist who is not likely to get input from the other parent. In fact, they will screen therapists and will engage only the services of those who will join in with them against the victimized parent.

Some therapists are naïve enough to agree at the outset that they will see the child with the understanding that the treatment will be kept secret from the alienated parent. I have seen many cases in which the victimized parent did not learn for weeks, months, and even years about the "treatment." Competent child therapists know that it is important for the therapist to have access to both parents, divorce notwithstanding. Incompetent therapists are generally not appreciative of this important principle and contribute thereby to PAS empowerment.

Some take the position that their role is to respect the child’s "perceptions." No matter how pathological the perception, no matter how divorced from reality, no matter how delusional, the therapist still rolls on with the child’s perception. And if the perception is that the alienated parent is despicable, abusive, dangerous, neglectful, etc., then the therapist accepts that as valid and does not question it. In fact, questioning it would be viewed as an antitherapeutic maneuver, because it would allegedly demean the child and get across the message that the therapist is not taking the child seriously. Competent therapists recognize that one of the purposes of therapy is to correct misconceptions in a benevolent way, in a way that does not necessarily demean the child. And this can certainly be done. The analogy to one’s own children is applicable here. A loving parent needs to criticize children continually, but the love and affection that lies beneath the criticisms are felt by the child, and they are not demeaned. The child recognizes that the correction of misperceptions is an important developmental experience and necessary for the child’s well-being.

Such "respect" for the child’s "perceptions" regarding the target parent is different from every other experience a child has in life, experiences in which other people express incredulity and disagreement with perceptions that have absolutely nothing to do with reality. And when the sex-abuse spin-off is operative here, then the result of such respect for the child’s "perception," can contribute to the promulgation of a false sex-abuse accusation. Some of these therapists, in the course of the treatment of these allegedly sexually-abused PAS children, repeatedly tell the child that the environment in the office is "safe." In fact, I have seen situations in which the facility has a room that is referred to as the "safe room." The implication there is that the alleged perpetrator is so relentless in the desire to abuse the child that some kind of protection on an ongoing basis is necessary.

I have seen situations in which the alleged perpetrator is incarcerated and yet the child is still told that he (she) is now "safe." This cannot but engender in the child the notion that the accused party is still dangerous and still likely to perpetrate sexual depravities. This approach cannot but engender unnecessary fears, hypervigilance, and anticipation of sexual dangers when there is no evidence for such. It is an antitherapeutic maneuver promulgated under the guise of being therapeutic. It also has the effect of empowering the child because it gets across the message that there are people all around who are constantly protecting the child from the alleged perpetrator.

There are therapists who subscribe to the principle that one of the purposes of treatment is to release feelings and "let it all out." They tell the PAS children that they must be angry at the victimized parent and that one of the purposes of the treatment is to let out the anger. The child is encouraged to punch dolls, bang with sticks, and even scream profanities. This is allegedly therapeutic. What it does is to entrench ever more deeply in the child’s brain circuitry the notion that the alienated parent is indeed a despicable individual. It encourages more acting out against that parent and strengthens the campaign of denigration. It also has the effect of producing the pathological empowerment that comes with the acting out of anger.

The same therapists who are ever proclaiming that they subscribe to the aforementioned principles of respect for the child’s professions, respect for the child’s perceptions, etc. generally have their limits regarding such alleged respect. They would not "respect" the child who refuses to go to school on an ongoing basis. They would not respect the child who wants to take drugs, drink alcohol, run away from home, or throw an infant sibling into the swimming pool. Yet, they fully respect the child’s campaign of denigration against the alienated parent and fully respect the derivative false sex-abuse accusation. They would not respect the child’s destruction of their own property, attempts to physically assault them personally (especially with weapons), or to burn down their offices. They would not respect the child who comes in with an animal that defecates on their rugs or attempts to bite them. They would not respect the child who comes in with a baseball bat and tries to wreak the waiting room. Yet, they respect the same child’s similar, if not identical behavior, when it is directed toward others, especially a victimized parent in a PAS.

The Occasional Role of the Alienated Parent in The PAS Children's Empowerment

I have seen many reports in which the examiners claim that the alienated parent has contributed to his or her grief. Some have claimed that they are "asking for it." I have never seen this happen. I consider targeted parents to be true victims. The comment is reminiscent of those who claim that women who are raped are "asking for it." Some claim that the alienated parent is overly intrusive, thereby provocative, and so contributes to the children’s animosity. I have not seen this to be the case. Rather, I find these parents to be suffering with profound feelings of helplessness and they repeatedly try to gain access to their children, which then becomes labeled as intrusiveness and even harassment. Some have claimed that victimized parents are narcissistic and have an inordinate sense of entitlement. I have never yet seen one such parent satisfy DSM-IV criteria for the Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

What I have seen, however, is passivity that has played a role in the empowerment of PAS children and the development of the PAS. Typically, the parents are fearful of imposing traditional disciplinary measures, lest the children become even more antagonistic. They are fearful that any criticism of either the children or the alienating parent will result in their being referred to as "liars" and this will become incorporated into the children’s campaign of denigration. This situation is worsened by courts typically warning divorcing parents never to criticize one another to the children. Accordingly, the parent who confronts the children with the fact that they are being programmed may be accused of violating court orders. Accordingly, the parent fears taking action and becomes viewed as an easy "pushover," as someone who can be degraded, mocked, and ignored with impunity and without consequences. Such is the humiliation suffered by the targeted parent. This passivity, so often imposed upon the targeted parent, contributes to the children’s empowerment and the intensification of their PAS symptomatology.

Conclusions

We are seeing, then, an empowerment of children unequaled in history. Many grandparents have said to me, with regard to their PAS grandchildren, comments along these lines: "When I was a kid, if I spoke to my father that way, he’d beat the daylights out of me," "It’s too bad they can’t whip kids anymore. A good whipping would cure that kid in five minutes," and "In my day kids would never dare to speak to their parents that way. They’d get the strap." I am not suggesting that we go back to physically abusing children. I am suggesting that we just go back to the point where reasonable and humane disciplinary and punitive measures are implemented so that children are not free to denigrate and humiliate with impunity their PAS-alienated parents. There must be accountability. There must be consequences. Without accountability and consequences, there cannot be a civilized society. PAS children are being programmed to be uncivilized and even to be psychopathic.

Such empowerment of children results in defective reality testing, narcissism, impairment in the ability to feel sympathy and empathy, and disrespect for authority that cannot but spread to nonparental figures, such as teachers and employers in the future. PAS children are often viewed as "spoiled brats" and justifiably so. My experience has been that such corruption of these children in their youth contributes to their becoming social misfits as adults.

I have described here how pathological empowerment is provided not only by parents of PAS children, but the whole network of mental and legal professionals who are involved in PAS litigation. The PAS is a product of the adversary system. Unfortunately, the system that is available to bring about alleviation of PAS symptomatology generally results in a deepening of the disorder adding, thereby, unnecessary grief to people who are already suffering painfully.

REFERENCES

1. Gardner, RA: Recent trends in divorce and custody litigation. Academy Forum (a publication of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis) 1985; 29(2):3-7

2. Gardner, RA: Child Custody Litigation: A Guide for Parents and Mental Health Professionals. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1986

3. Gardner, RA: The Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Differentiation Between Fabricated and Genuine Child Sex Abuse. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1987

4. Gardner, RA: Child custody. In Basic Handbook of Child Psychiatry, edited by Noshpitz, J.D., Vol. V, pp. 637-646. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1987

5. Gardner, RA: Judges interviewing children in custody/visitation litigation. New Jersey Family Lawyer 1987; 7(2):26ff

6. Gardner, RA: Family Evaluation in Child Custody Mediation, Arbitration, and Litigation. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1989

7. Gardner, RA: Legal and psychotherapeutic approaches to the three types of parental alienation syndrome families: when psychiatry and the law join forces. Court Review 1991; 28(1):14-21

8. Gardner, RA: The Parents Book About Divorce, Second Edition (paperback). New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1991

9. Gardner, RA: The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Guide for Mental Health and Legal Professionals. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1992

10. Gardner, RA: The detrimental effects on women of the misguided gender egalitarianism of child-custody resolution guidelines. The Academy Forum (a publication of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis) 1994; 38(1/2): 10-13

11. Gardner, RA: Recommendations for dealing with parents who induce a parental alienation syndrome in their children. Issues in Child Abuse Accusations 1997; 8(3): 174-178.

12. Gardner, RA: Recommendations for dealing with parents who induce a parental alienation syndrome in their children. Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 1998; 28(3/4):1-23.

13. Gardner, RA: The Parental Alienation Syndrome, Second Edition. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1998

14. Gardner, RA: Differentiating between the parental alienation syndrome and bone fide abuse/neglect. American Journal of Family Therapy 1999; 27(2)

15. Gardner, RA: Family therapy of the moderate type of parental alienation syndrome. The American Journal of Family Therapy 1999, 27(3): 195-212.

16. Gardner, RA: Therapeutic Interventions for Children with Parental Alienation Syndrome. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 2001

17. Gardner, RA: The parental alienation syndrome: Sixteen years later. The Academy Forum (a publication of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis) 2001; (in press)

18. The American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV). American Psychiatric Association, 1994

19. Gardner RA: Sex Abuse Hysteria: Salem Witch Trials Revisited. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1991

20. Reactive Backlash and Overreactive Backlash. News for Women in Psychiatry (a publication of The Association of Women Psychiatrists), 16(2):3-7,24.

21. Gardner, RA: Psychotherapy with Sex-Abuse Victims: True, False, and Hysterical. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc.,

1996

22. Gardner, RA: True and False Accusations of Child Sex Abuse. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1992

23. Gardner, RA: Protocols for the Sex-Abuse Evaluation. Cresskill, New Jersey: Creative Therapeutics, Inc., 1995

24. Gardner, RA: Leading stimuli, leading gestures, and leading questions. Issues in Child Abuse Accusations 1992 4(3):144-155.

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about the author

Richard A. Gardner, M.D. is Clinical Professor of Child Psychiatry at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, in New York City. In addition, he is in private practice in Cresskill, New Jersey. He is the author of numerous books and articles on various aspects of forensic psychiatry. His most recent books related to this article: The Parental Alienation Syndrome, Second Edition (1998) and Therapeutic Interventions for Children with Parental Alienation Syndrome (2001).


The original article can be found here: http://www.fact.on.ca/Info/pas/gard02c.htm

Interference with Visitation

1. What is Interference with visitation?

After a bitter divorce, visitation disputes can linger for years if not decades. I have seen many people ruin their lives by engaging in mental warfare with their ex-spouse over visitation disputes. In many cases, ex-wives use visitation as a bargaining chip to force their ex-husband to pay his child support. Moreover, in many cases ex-wives try to frustrate visitation so that she can essentially shut out the ex-husband. In many cases, stepfathers take over the parental responsibilities after a divorce. Unfortunately, many ex-wives frustrate visitation with the biological father if they remarry, and if the stepfather is caring and a good financial provider for the children.

Interference with visitation can take many forms. It can be attempts to prevent visits. It can be "poisoning" the child with negative talk about the other parent. It also includes the prevention of communication between the parent and the non-custodial parent. Letters, phone calls and gifts can be kept from the child. It can also be attempts to make visitation difficult by scheduling appointment or activities during the expected time of the visit.

2. What can I do if I experience interference with my visitation rights?

The courts have many remedies to address interference. These can include a make-up visit(s) for those missed, increased visitation time, fines, and even possible jail time. Some courts will find the custodial parent in contempt of the court-ordered visitation schedule. In extreme cases, the courts may remove the children from the custodial parent and place them with the other.

In my experience the best strategy to avoid repeated interference with visitation is to require that all of the pick up and drop off of the children occur at the local police station. The parties will be forced to act more civil to each other if they have to conduct their "business" at the police station. Moreover, if one party fails to appear, then a police incident report can be prepared to document any violations of any court orders.

3. I never get to have visitation(s) with my children. Do I still have to pay child support?

The answer to this question is an unequivocal "Yes." Visitation and child support are two separate and distinct issues. The custodial parent has a duty to allow a non-custodial parent visitation with the children, and the non-custodial parent has the duty to pay child support. If there is interference with your visitation, then you must file a motion in the family court to enforce your visitation rights.

A non-custodial parent can file a motion to have the child support placed in an escrow account until any visitation disputes are resolved. In many cases, the best method to convince an embittered ex-wife to permit visitation is to exert financial pressure on her. It may be advisable to file a motion and request that the court order that the Probation Department hold all of the child support payments in escrow until any visitation dispute(s) are resolved. If the judge is open minded, then he may carefully consider this request.

4. Can interference with visitation amount to a substantial change of circumstances to warrant a change of custody?

Interference by one parent in the relationship of a child and the other parent is almost never in the child's best interests. Most courts and experts agree that except in unusual cases it is most important for a child to have a strong relationship with both parents. Thus, courts will typically conclude that an award of custody to the parent who is most likely to foster as relationship between the child and the other parent is in the child's best interests. For this reason, if a custodial parent has demonstrated in the past a pattern of interference with the relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent, unless other facts dictate a difference holding, a court will frequently conclude that a substantial chance in circumstances justifying a change of custody has occurred.

The most common form of interference with parental rights which is remedied by courts occurs when custodial parents consistently refuse to turn children over to the non-custodial parent for a court-ordered visitation. The fact that the courts frequently order changes of custody changes of custody in these circumstances is perfectly understandable, since a court-ordered visitation is often the non-custodial parent's only connections to his or her children. If this visitation is frustrated, the child's best interests are clearly injured because the child will be completely deprived of a relationship with the non-custodial parent.

Courts frequently conclude that where the custodial attempts to show the other parent in a negative light, a substantial change in circumstance has occurred which justifies a change of custody. Experts generally agree that when a custodial parent speaks negatively about the non-custodial parent in presence of the child, a custodial parent causes great damage to the emotional and mental health of the child.

5. What legal clauses should I insert into the divorce judgment to protect my visitation rights?

In order to prevent a child's relationship with the non-custodial parent from deteriorating, certain provisions should be standard in every divorce judgment. First, every divorce judgment should require each person with a right to custody or visitation to foster the relationship between the child and other persons who have a right to custody or visitation. Second, every divorce judgment should state that persons who have custodial or visitation rights should not speak ill of another person who has custodial or visitation rights. Third, there should be restrictions on a custodial parent's right to relocate without informing the court or the non-custodial parent.

These three provisions will not guarantee that no problems with custody or visitation will occur. If the above provisions are inserted into a divorce judgment, then a violation of a specific provision could lead to a contempt violation. While not a panacea, the above three provisions may give the non-custodial parent the extra edge which he or she may need in any post-judgment custody dispute. Furthermore, since the provisions encourage a strong relationship between both parent the child, such provisions are generally in the child's best interest.

6. My evil ex-wife will not permit me to have visitation with my children? The family courts are useless, and my wife simply ignores all of the judge's orders. Can I file criminal charges against my ex-wife from hell?

In the event that the family courts fail to adequately resolve visitation disputes, then a person might consider filing a criminal charge against their ex-spouse for criminal interference with visitation/custody. The remedy is powerful indeed, but the right circumstances must exist for it to be sought. The statute for violation of visitation/custody rights is N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4. A violation of the interference with custody statute is a third degree crime, unless the child is taken, detained, enticed or concealed outside the United States, in which it is a crime of the second degree.

In addition to a possible jail term, a person convicted of interference with custody/visitation of a minor child will be required to make restitution of all reasonable expenses and costs. This includes reasonable counsel fees incurred by the other parent in securing the child's return.

The county prosecutors are very reluctant to get involved in family law disputes. It will be very hard to convince a prosecutor to pursue an indictment for interference with visitation rights. I would advise a client to file a motion in the Family Court, and request that the judge refer the case to the county prosecutor for a review for a possible indictment. The county prosecutor may take a serious look at a criminal charge for criminal interference with visitation/custody rights if it is referred to their office by a judge. In all likelihood, the county prosecutor still will decline to pursue an indictment. However, the custodial spouse when faced with the enormous threats and pressure of being indicted, probably will cave in and permit visitation.

7. Can I sue my ex-wife for her constant interference with my visitation rights?

Yes. The deliberate interference with the legal right of a spouse to custody and visitation is a marital tort. Therefore, if you ex-spouse ruins your relationship with your children by interfering with your visitation, then you can sue her in the civil courts for a tort claim. It must be emphasized that marital tort claims for interference with visitation rights are very rarely filed. The right to file a tort for this type of cause of action does indeed exist. However, there are many types of laws and potential claims of action that exist in the books, but in the real world do not exist. If a marital tort for interference with custody/visitation rights is filed then in all likelihood, the civil court would transfer the case to the Family Court.

There are some powerful benefits to filing a marital tort though. The filing of a lawsuit will convey to your ex-wife that you mean business, and that you are not going away. The ex-wife may try to resolve the visitation dispute to avoid the costs of hiring a lawyer to respond to the lawsuit. Many times that sole purpose of filing a lawsuit is to force the parties to reach a compromise. Therefore, in many cases the filing of a marital tort can force a settlement.

8. What are some practical tips to enforce my visitation rights?

I always advise my client to keep a calendar. Have witnesses when trying to pick up a child. Call police as a civil standby, and obtain incident reports from them later. Always make sure that all parties are well informed as to the time and place of the pick up or exchange. If you can do this in writing, so much the better, it will prove a record if needed later. Keep and organize all written correspondence with the other parent. Keep all this together with your journal. If after doing all of the above, the custodial parent still denies your visitation, then file a contempt motion against her.

Information provided by:
Theodore Sliwinski, Esq. located at
http://www.divorcecenterofnj.com

Interference With Parental Rights Of Noncustodial Parent As Grounds For Modification Of Child Custody

by Edward B. Borris, Assistant Editor, Divorce Litigation,
Divorce Litigation, January, 1997, p. 1

I. Introduction

Interference by one parent in the relationship of a child and the other parent is almost never in the child's best interests. In fact, in extreme cases, actions by one parent to alienate the affections of the child from the other parent, to interfere win the other parent's visitation rights, or to remove the child to a distant state or country can often lead to liability in tort. See generally E. Borris, "Torts Arising Out of Interference with Custody and Visitation," 7 Divorce Litigation 192 (1995). Tort liability is not always an option, however, as many courts refuse to award damages based upon interference with visitation rights. E.g., Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243 (Wyo.1994).

A noncustodial parent is not always left without a remedy, however, simply because courts in that parent's jurisdiction refuse to recognize tort actions arising out of interference with his or her parental rights. This article discusses a different type of liability which may result from interference with the noncustodial parent's rights: loss of custody. The article will first discuss whether a party may generally obtain a change of custody based upon such interference. The article will then examine specific acts by a custodial parent which may cause a court to change custody, including denial of visitation rights, alienation of the child's affections away from the noncustodial parent, and removal of the child to a distant jurisdiction. The section on alienation of the child's affections includes a discussion of Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) and recent cases that have dealt with PAS. The article concludes with a suggestion of possible provisions that practitioners may insert in custody decrees in order to prevent future problems between custodial and noncustodial parents.

II. Interference Amounting to a Substantial Change in Circumstances

Most courts and experts agree that except in unusual cases it is most important for a child to have a strong relationship with both parents. Thus, courts will typically conclude that an award of custody to the parent who is most likely to foster a relationship between the child and the other parent is in the child's best interests. For this reason, if a custodial parent has demonstrated in the past a pattern of interference with the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent, unless other facts dictate a different holding, courts will frequently conclude that a substantial change in circumstances justifying a change of custody has occurred.

Not surprisingly, there is a long-standing tradition of awarding a change of custody where the custodial parent has interfered with the parental rights of the other parent. The Court of Appeals of Maryland clearly established this point in Berlin v. Berlin, 239 Md. 52, 210 A.2d 380 (1965). In Berlin, the parties entered into a written separation agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, incorporated into the court's order, custody of the children was awarded to the mother, and the father received reasonable visitation rights. In addition, the parties also agreed that the mother would notify the father if the mother moved out of the Washington metropolitan area. Subsequently, the mother began denying the father his right to visitation. For this reason, the father requested a change in custody. The trial court granted the father's request, and the mother appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court properly changed custody to the father. As support for its decision, the court noted only that "the record indicates that the mother had deprived the father of his rights of visitation for a substantial period of time and that he is a fit and proper person to have custody of the children." 210 A.2d at 384. Thus, in Maryland, where a parent has attempted to create emotional distance between the other parent and the child, that parent has committed an act so egregious that the other parent could be awarded custody based solely on this one fact.

Another court which reached this conclusion was Walden v. Walden, 112 A.D.2d 1035, 492 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1987). In Walden, the parties' marriage produced two children, who were minors at the time of the divorce proceeding. The parties entered into a stipulation that awarded sole custody of the daughter to the mother and sole custody of the son to the father. Subsequently, the father filed a motion for a change of custody of the daughter to himself. The mother filed a cross-motion for a change of custody of the son to herself. The trial court awarded custody of both children to the mother, and the father appealed.

On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial court's decision to award custody to the mother. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the father had influenced the son to derogatorily call the mother by her name rather than "mother," and the child "mimicked the abusive names which he had heard the [father] direct at her." 492 N.Y.S.2d at 829. Therefore, the court believed that in order to "remedy the deteriorating relationship" it was in the son's best interests that the mother be awarded custody of the son. Id. Hence, where one parent has alienated the child from the other parent, in order to repair the relationship it is in the child's best interests for the innocent parent to receive custody.

Likewise, in Gentry v. Simmons, 754 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.Ct.App.1988), the parties divorced in 1982. Pursuant to the decree, custody of the parties' minor daughter was awarded to the mother. Subsequently, the father alleged that the mother and her new husband had attempted to degrade the father in front of the child. For this reason, the father alleged that he should be awarded custody. The trial court disagreed and awarded custody and attorney's fees to the mother. The father appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Missouri noted that the mother had repeatedly attempted to frustrate the father's right to visitation. Also, in the presence of the child, the mother held conversations that were critical of the father. Furthermore, frequently, when the father was speaking with the child on the telephone, the mother would monitor the call and force the child to hang up on her father. In addition, the mother degraded the father in the presence of the child. In fact, because the mother had so actively sought to injure the child's view of the father, her strategy backfired, and the child actually began to resent the mother. Based upon these facts, the court of appeals held that the trial court incorrectly awarded custody to the mother:

The evidence, including the mother and stepfather's own testimony, indicated that they held the father in low regard, degraded him in [the child's] presence, depicted him as an evil person with whom [the child] should have no contact and engaged in persistent efforts to destroy [the child's] natural affection for her father. The mother expressed it as her preference that [the child] have nothing to do with her father, a directive which [the child] continually resisted. This state of facts showing an attempt by one parent to alienate a child from the other parent is a changed condition and can form the basis for a modification of custody, Eatherton v. Eatherton, 725 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Mo. [Ct.] App.1987). When a parent who has custody makes disrespectful and abusive statements against the other parent and attempts to wean the children away, the decree can properly be modified and the custody changed. Garrett v. Garrett, 464 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Mo. [Ct.] App.1971.)

Id. at 582 (emphasis added). Thus, if one parent speaks in a derogatory manner about the other parent and engages in other efforts to destroy the child's relationship with the other parent, the other parent should be awarded custody.

In Nauman v. Nauman, 445 N.W.2d 38 (S.D.1989), the parties were divorced in 1980. Custody of the parties' two minor children was awarded to the mother. The father was awarded reasonable visitation. Subsequently, the father attempted to exercise his visitation rights, but the mother frustrated these attempts. The father tried to call the mother, but she refused to take his telephone calls. The mother told the father that the children did not want to visit him. In 1987, the father filed an action for a change of custody. The trial court concluded that it was in the children's best interests to be placed with the father. The mother appealed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the trial court correctly vested custody in the father. In entering this decision, the court recognized that the mother had repeatedly frustrated the father's attempts to visit with the children. Also, the mother had engaged in efforts to alienate the children from the father:

Here, the record indicates that there was in fact a substantial and material change in circumstances since the decree of divorce was entered. Most importantly, mother has been unwilling to abide by the trial court's orders regarding visitation, thereby aggravating an already hostile relationship between the parties. She has also attempted to alienate the children from their father, as shown by the children's parroting of language used by mother in her arguments with father. Furthermore, mother has communicated her hostile feelings through the children rather than by direct communication with father, and she has allowed the children to read the legal documents in this case and has solicited their responses.

Id. at 39. Thus, as the court noted in this passage, where one parent attempts to (1) frustrate the other parent's right to visitation, and (2) alienate the child from the other parent, the other parent should be awarded custody.

Also, in Marriage of Birge, 34 Or.App. 581, 579 P.2d 297 (1978), the mother was awarded custody of the parties' child. Shortly thereafter, the mother voluntarily gave custody to the father. Subsequently, the mother filed an action for a change of custody back to herself. The trial court awarded custody to the mother, and the father appealed.

On appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals, the trial court's decision to award custody to the mother was affirmed. The court noted that the mother "experienced difficulty in exercising her visitation rights." 579 P.2d at 298. Also, the mother was "subjected to verbal abuse and harassment in front of the child whenever she would begin and end her visitations." Id. Thus, because the father had interfered with the mother's right to visit with the child and because the father had belittled the mother in the presence of the child, it was proper to award custody to the mother.

For other cases where courts changed custody based upon interference with the noncustodial parent's parental rights, see England v. England, 650 So.2d 888 (Ala.Civ.App.1994) (where mother refused to allow father access to child, trial court correctly modified custody award to place custody with father); In re Marriage of Quirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 1993) (efforts of mother to deprive father of court-ordered visitation constituted substantial change of circumstances); In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 524 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (change of custody to mother was warranted where father's new wife had forbidden child to talk to the mother; father failed to respect mother's contact with child); In re Marriage of Clifford, 515 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (custody of children was properly changed from mother to father, based on evidence of mother's interference with father's visitation rights); Shortt v. Lasswell, 765 S.W.2d 387 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (award of change of custody to mother was warranted where paternal grandparents had attempted to alienate the child from the mother); Cornell v. Cornell, 809 S.W.2d 869 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (award of change of custody to father was justified where mother had attempted to alienate the daughter from the father); Young v. Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1995) (custodial parent's interference with relationship between child and noncustodial parent justified change of custody); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 216 A.D.2d 627, 627 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1995) (modification of custody was justified where mother consistently violated court-ordered visitation and telephone contact); Betancourt v. Boughton, 204 A.D.2d 804, 611 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1994) (court awarded change of custody from mother to father where mother interfered with father's visitation rights); Jeschke v. Wockenfuss, 534 N.W.2d 602 (S.D.1995) (modification of custody from father to mother was consistent with best interests of the children where father had consistently interfered with mother's relationship with children); and Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (mother's interference with father's visitation rights was a material change in circumstances).

III. Jurisdictions That Conclude That Parental Interference is not Grounds for Modification

Although it is clearly the minority position, courts in some jurisdictions have held that interference with the noncustodial parent's parental rights is not grounds for a change of custody. Surprisingly, most of these courts conclude that such interference is not so severe that it affects the child's best interests. See generally Annot., "Interference by Custodian of Child with Noncustodial Parent's Visitation Rights as Ground for Change of Custody," 28 A.L.R.4th 9 (1984).

Due to an unusual statute in Wisconsin, it is virtually impossible for a noncustodial parent to be awarded a change of custody based upon interference with his or her parental rights by the custodial parent, where the noncustodial parent has filed the action within two years of the prior custody order. Pursuant to Wis.Stat.Ann. § 767.325(1) (West 1988), where a parent files a motion for a change of custody within two years of the prior order, that parent may not receive an award of a change of custody unless he or she presents "substantial evidence that the modification is necessary because the current custodial conditions are physically or emotionally harmful to the best interests of the child." In interpreting this statute, courts in Wisconsin have held that interference with the noncustodial parent's parental rights within two years of a custody order will not justify a change of custody. For example, in Stephanie R.N. v. Wendy L.D., 174 Wis.2d 745, 498 N.W.2d 235 (1993), the parties had one minor child. In August 1988, the court in Wisconsin awarded custody to the mother and alternate weekend and holiday visitation to the father. On several occasions, the mother denied the father his visitation rights. In February 1989, the trial court awarded temporary custody to the father, but the mother refused to transfer custody to the father. As a result, a sheriff forcibly entered the mother's house to retrieve the child. In December 1989, the trial court held additional hearings and transferred permanent custody to the father. This decision was based, in part, upon the mother's unreasonable interference with the father's visitation rights. The mother appealed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that because of the language of § 767.325(1)(a) the trial court improperly transferred custody to the father. The court specifically wrote that, although interference with visitation rights may be emotionally harmful to the child, interference with visitation rights will not justify a change of custody within the two-year period after the previous custody decision:

Moreover, at what point does the harm or threat of harm caused by denial of visitation make modification "necessary?" As explained above, the sec. 767.325(1)(a), Stats., standard requires "necessity," which suggests some immediate need for modification. "Necessity" also requires more than that the modification is in the child's best interests. The fact that denial of visitation may cause emotional harm to a child does not indicate when modification becomes "necessary."

498 N.W.2d at 243 (emphasis in original). As the court wrote, under § 767.325(1)(a), denials of visitation, even if willful and repeated, do not create a "necessity" for a transfer of custody within the two-year period.

Although this decision may appear harsh, a further analysis of the case indicates that the decision may have been a correct reading of § 767.325(1)(a). As the court of appeals noted in its earlier decision in the case, § 767.325(1)(a) specifically omits a best-interests standard in favor of a "necessity" standard. In re Paternity of S.R.N., 167 Wis.2d 315, 481 N.W.2d 672 (Ct.App.1992). Furthermore, as the court of appeals stated, the legislative history of § 767.325(1)(a) indicates that the legislature intended to create a "'time out' or 'truce' period of two years during which the child and the parents can adjust to the new family situation." 481 N.W.2d at 679. Thus, as the court of appeals and supreme court believed, interference with visitation during the two-year window, although possibly harmful to the child, is not harmful enough to justify breaking the "truce" period mandated by the legislature. Regardless of whether this decision is sound, one cannot help but wonder if the courts and the legislature in Wisconsin have given custodial parents the "green light" to interfere with the rights of noncustodial parents for the first two years after the divorce. In order to prevent such a catastrophe, S.R.N. should be limited to its facts. In S.R.N., although the mother denied the father's court-ordered visitation, the mother did not completely cut off the child's access to the father. Rather, the mother permitted the father to see the child so long as the father did not remove the child from her house. Future courts should conclude that if a custodial parent completely cuts off access to the child by the noncustodial parent, a change of custody is appropriate, even if the request is made within the two-year "truce" period.

Without any legislative assistance, some courts have established a flat rule that interference with a noncustodial parent's parental rights does not per se amount to a substantial change in circumstances which justifies a modification. Courts in Florida appear to have firmly adopted this rule. For example, in Bryant v. Meredith, 610 So.2d 586 (Fla.2d DCA 1992), a child was born out of wedlock. The court awarded primary residential custody to the mother and liberal visitation to the father. The court also required the parties to inform each other of his or her new address if either of them relocated. Subsequently, the father remarried and the mother moved to a different city. Then, the father filed an action for a modification of custody, alleging (1) frustration of his visitation rights, and (2) failure of the mother to inform him of her new address.

In denying the modification, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida wrote:

We are concerned that there was some evidence that the mother was frustrating visitation and telephonic contact between the father and the child. The father testified and the mother admitted that she failed to advise him where she was moving. Consequently, he was unable to contact the child during the month of August 1990. However, there is also evidence that the father aggravated the visitation issue by his extremely inflexible attitude. Despite the existence of problems with visitation, the record shows that visitation took place while the child was a resident of Georgia. The custodial parent's frustration of visitation rights, alone, does not justify a change in residential custody.

Id. at 588. Hence, as noted by the court in Florida, a denial of parental rights of the noncustodial parent does not amount to a substantial change in circumstances which would justify a change in custody. Accord Sherman v. Sherman, 558 So.2d 149 (Fla.3d DCA 1990); Schweinberg v. Click, 627 So.2d 548 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Pierce v. Pierce, 620 N.E.2d 726 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).

IV. Specific Acts of Interference Which May Cause a Court to Change Custody

After a practitioner determines whether the relevant jurisdiction may award a change of custody based upon acts of interference with the noncustodial parent's rights, it must be determined which particular acts will justify such a change. The relevant authority indicates that three distinct fact patterns may justify a change. First, courts often award a change of custody if the custodial parent repeatedly interferes with the noncustodial parent's court- ordered visitation rights. Second, courts are inclined to award a change of custody if the custodial parent alienates the child's affections away from the noncustodial parent. Third, if the custodial parent removes the child to a distant jurisdiction without informing the noncustodial parent of the move, courts frequently order a change of custody. Each of these scenarios will be addressed in turn.

Frustration of Visitation Rights

The most common form of interference with parental rights which is remedied by courts occurs when custodial parents consistently refuse to turn children over to the noncustodial parents for court-ordered visitation. The fact that courts frequently order changes of custody in this circumstance is perfectly understandable, since court-ordered visitation is often the noncustodial parent's only connection to his or her children. If this visitation is frustrated, the child's best interests are clearly injured because the child will be completely deprived of a relationship with the noncustodial parent.

Thus, the court in Ready v. Ready, 906 P.2d 382 (Wyo.1995), transferred custody because of the frustration of visitation rights by the custodial parent. In Ready, the divorce decree awarded primary physical custody of the parties' four children to the mother, subject to the father's visitation rights. For several years thereafter, the parties were in constant contact with the court because of disputes over the father's visitation rights. Approximately three years after the divorce, the court found the mother in contempt of court and warned her that an additional contempt order might cause her to lose custody. At a subsequent show cause hearing, "evidence was produced that Mother had repeatedly frustrated Father's visitation rights." Id. at 384. Based upon this fact, the trial court ruled that "the children were suffering because they were not able to spend time with their father and therefore it was in the children's best interests for Father to have custody of the children." Id.

The mother appealed, arguing that the facts did not indicate that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. The Supreme Court of Wyoming wrote, however, that because the mother showed no inclination to honor the father's visitation rights, the trial court clearly did not err by changing custody:

Although Mother argues that no substantial change in circumstances has occurred, certainly she must concede her repeated failure to abide by the district court's orders is a matter which neither the parties nor the court could have foreseen when drafting the original decree. In its order from the bench, the district court stated, "I will simply acknowledge on the Bench that there is no way I can get [the mother] to obey the orders of this Court in extending visitation privileges to [the father], and I am going to transfer custody as of today to [the father]." The district court has broad discretion to determine whether Mother's behavior affected the children's welfare. The court also stated, "I told you before, every time you do this the victims get it, the victims are the kids."

Id. at 385. Hence, as the court stated, repeated denials of visitation cause injuries to the children. Thus, it would be improper to leave the children in the custody of the person who caused those injuries.

Similarly, a court in New York indicated that the repeated frustration of visitation rights is so injurious to the children that such frustration may, in effect, create a presumption that the offending parent is unfit to continue to have custody. In Young v. Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1995), the parties' marriage produced four minor children and the mother was initially awarded custody at the parties' divorce. Subsequently, the father filed a motion for a change of custody. This motion was based, in part, upon "the mother's ongoing interference with visitation." 628 N.Y.S.2d at 959. In awarding a change of custody, the appellate division wrote:

Indeed, a custodial parent's interference with the relationship between a child and a noncustodial parent has been said to be "an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the child as to per se raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent[.]"

Id. at 958 (quoting Maloney v. Maloney, 208 A.D.2d 603, 617 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (1994)). Thus, the Appellate Division, Second Department, of New York has taken a strong stand against interference with visitation rights by the custodial parents. Such interference is so egregious, according to the court, that there is a "strong probability" that the offending party is not fit to act as the child's custodian.

For other recent cases where the court awarded a change in custody based upon repeated violations of court-ordered visitation, see In re Marriage of Quirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 1993); Smith v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 222 (Minn.Ct.App.1993); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 216 A.D.2d 627, 627 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1995); Betancourt v. Boughton, 204 A.D.2d 804, 611 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1994); and Jeschke v. Wockenfuss, 534 N.W.2d 602 (S.D.1995).

Nonetheless, some courts have simply held that denials of visitation rights do not justify changes of custody. The court in Lesavich v. Anderson, 192 W.Va. 553, 453 S.E.2d 387 (1994), reached this conclusion. In Lesavich, the divorce decree awarded custody of the parties' daughter to the mother. The decree also awarded visitation to the father, which would increase as the child got older. Subsequently, the father filed a petition for a change in custody. This petition alleged that the mother "had failed to afford [the father] reasonable visitation rights." 453 S.E.2d at 388. After reviewing the evidence, the family law master concluded that "the [mother] was never going to permit visitation by [the father] with the child" and recommended a change of custody to the husband. Id. The trial court agreed and awarded the recommended change of custody. Believing that a denial of visitation, even if persistent, would not justify a change of custody absent a showing that such a change would materially benefit the child, this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. See also Bryant v. Meredith, 610 So.2d 586 (Fla.2d DCA 1992) (custodial parent's frustration of visitation rights does not, alone, justify a change of custody); Rogge v. Rogge, 509 N.W.2d 163 (Minn.Ct.App.1993) (unwarranted denial of visitation is not controlling on issue of whether to grant a modification of custody); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 888 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (no change of custody was warranted where mother failed to honor father's visitation rights on only one occasion); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 249 Neb. 573, 544 N.W.2d 354 (1996) (frustration of visitation did not justify change in custody from mother to father; father only missed two weekend visitations and grandmother interfered with one holiday visitation).

Alienation of Child's Affections from Noncustodial Parent

Courts frequently conclude that where the custodial parent attempts to show the other parent in a negative light, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred which justifies a change of custody. As noted in the case of Young v. Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1995), experts generally agree that when a custodial parent speaks negatively about the noncustodial parent in the presence of the child, a custodial parent causes great damage to the emotional and mental health of the child. In Young, the parties' marriage produced four minor children. From 1988 until 1992, the mother had custody of the parties' children. In 1992, the father moved for a change of custody, alleging that the mother's behavior was "calculated to destroy the children's relationship with [him]." 628 N.Y.S.2d at 959. The father noted that during the four-year period of the mother's custody the mother had repeatedly made false allegations of abuse in order to destroy the relationship between the children and their father. A report by an expert witness confirmed the husband's beliefs:

"It has become eminently clear that if the four children of the Young marriage are left in the care of [the mother], they will have no relationship with their biological father, but they will grow up in an environment where they are taught that he is a devilishly perverse parent who offers them an ever-present threat of abuse. There is clear information to support [the mother's] everyday teaching of this to her children without the slightest appreciation of how that distorts their view of themselves, her past or their father.... She is single-minded in trying to teach the children how dangerous their father is and through that single-minded preoccupation does not allow them to form any type of neutral relationship with their father.["]

Id. at 962-63. In spite of the expert's report that indicated that the mother was intentionally destroying the relationship with the father, because the children stated a desire to remain with the mother, the trial court refused to award a change of custody. After recognizing "the mother's consistent preaching to the children that their father was an evil and dangerous man," the Appellate Division, Second Department, overruled the decision of, Second Department, the trial court and awarded a change of custody to the father. Id. at 963; see also Stamps v. Rawlins, 297 Ark. 370, 761 S.W.2d 933 (1988) (custodial parent screamed at father in the presence of the child; change of custody was warranted); Theisen v. Theisen, 405 N.W.2d 470 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (modification of custody was justified where custodial parent repeatedly made false accusations to children regarding the noncustodial parent); Jeschke v. Wockenfuss, 534 N.W.2d 602 (S.D.1995) (custodial parent repeatedly called the noncustodial parent vulgar names in front of the children).

In spite of the above authority, some courts believe that a transfer of custody is no cure for the alienation of the child's affections from the noncustodial parent. For this reason, even where the custodial parent has clearly damaged the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent, these courts will refuse to award a change of custody. For example, in Wiederholt v. Fischer, 169 Wis.2d 524, 485 N.W.2d 442 (Ct.App.1992), the mother gave birth to three children prior to the parties' divorce. The divorce decree awarded primary placement of the children to the mother, and reasonable visitation rights to the father. Subsequent to the divorce, each party filed numerous allegations that the other party had violated the divorce decree with respect to the awards of custody and visitation. In 1990, the father moved for a change of custody. The basis of the motion was that the children suffered from "Parental Alienation Syndrome." 485 N.W.2d at 443. In fact, the father's expert witness indicated that two of the parties' children had "one of the worst cases I've ever seen in doing this kind of work." Id. at 444. The expert also noted that the mother was the cause of the syndrome. Nonetheless, the trial court refused to order a change in custody, and the father appealed.

On appeal, the decision by the trial court to refuse to change custody was affirmed. The court believed that a transfer of custody was not necessarily a cure for the children's ills, and the children had no desire to live with their father. Thus, even though the children were clearly being alienated from their father, a change of custody was not warranted. See also In re Marriage of Hansen, 48 Or.App. 193, 616 P.2d 567 (1980) (court refused to award change in custody even though custodial parent caused confrontations with noncustodial parent whenever noncustodial parent came to the custodial parent's house to visit the children).

Parental Alienation Syndrome

As demonstrated by the Wiederholt case, a recent trend has developed whereby noncustodial parents have attempted to gain custody by alleging that the child at issue is suffering from Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS). The theory of PAS was developed by Dr. Richard Gardner. See generally R.A. Gardner, M.D., The Parental Alienation Syndrome (1992). "Dr. Gardner describes PAS as a disturbance in which children are not merely systematically and consciously 'brainwashed' but are also subconsciously and unconsciously 'programmed' by one parent against the other." Wood, "The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability," 27 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 1367, 1370 (June 1994) (quoting R.A. Gardner, supra, at 60). Thus, PAS occurs when one parent consciously programs the child to disfavor the other parent.

As noted in Wiederholt v. Fischer, 169 Wis.2d 524, 485 N.W.2d 442 (Ct.App.1992), the possible existence of this syndrome does not always compel a court to award a change of custody. Some courts have concluded, however, that where a child has been programmed to disfavor the noncustodial parent a change in custody is warranted. In Karen B. v. Clyde M., 151 Misc.2d 794, 574 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Fam.Ct.1991), aff'd, Karen "PP" v. Clyde "QQ", 197 A.D.2d 753, 602 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1993), the parties' daughter was born out of wedlock. The parties entered into a joint custody arrangement in 1990. Subsequently, the mother filed a motion in which she requested that she be awarded full custody. In the motion, the mother alleged physical and sexual abuse of the child by the father. A caseworker conducted an investigation. The caseworker testified that the child informed her that she had been abused. An expert at the Department of Social Services conducted a further investigation. The mother repeated the allegations to the expert. The expert attempted to ask the mother questions, but the mother could not answer the expert's questions unless the mother started over from the beginning and repeated the entire story. Furthermore, the child stated that she had been just "[m]aking believe" when she informed others of the alleged incidents of abuse. 574 N.Y.S.2d at 269. At trial, the expert concluded that the mother desired to remove the father from her and the child's lives, and "there was no information which would indicate that [the child] had been sexually abused by her father." Id. Also, a pediatrician examined the child and concluded that the child had not been abused.

Subsequently, the mother contacted the Department of Social Services again and made additional allegations of sexual abuse. In an interview, the child stated that she had been sexually abused by her father. After interviewing the child, another expert witness concluded that the child had been abused by the father. The expert indicated, however, that false allegations of abuse were "most common" during periods of hostility between parents. Id. at 270. Several other witnesses observed that the child displayed no fear of the father.

In a decision that was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department, of New York, the trial court removed the child from the custody of the mother and placed custody of the child with the father. In entering this decision, the court cited a report by Dr. Gardner concerning PAS. Id. at 271. Based upon Dr. Gardner's report, the trial court concluded that the mother had "programmed" the child to accuse the father of sexual abuse so that she could obtain custody. Id. at 272. As the court wrote:

In the case before the Court, [the mother] has sought to destroy the reputation of her former friend and lover by accusing him of one of the most heinous crimes known to man. The aura of the allegation, irrespective of its falsehood, may stand over him and affect him for the rest of his life. Likewise, by involving her own daughter in her nefarious scheme, she may have inflicted irreparable psychological damage on her. Like Medea, she is ready to sacrifice her child to accomplish her selfish goal.

Id. In other words, because the child had been programmed to accuse the father of abuse, a change of custody which awarded full custody to the father was appropriate.

As indicated in Wood, supra, 27 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. at 1370, PAS is a relatively new concept which has not been thoroughly studied except by Dr. Gardner. Thus, particularly when a child accuses a parent of sexual abuse, practitioners should be cautious about alleging the existence of PAS. At the same time, as noted in Karen B. v. Clyde M., supra, a custodial parent who wants to end the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent has every incentive to repeatedly allege sexual abuse. Until PAS is further studied by experts such as Dr. Gardner, parties should concentrate on the facts in the case, and whether the child is actually being harmed by abuse or by the custodial parent's attempts to alienate the child from the father's affections. In other words, attorneys should attack or defend alleged abusers without discussing PAS until further studies are conducted. Otherwise, experts who allege that PAS has occurred in a particular case will face a stiff cross- examination on the very existence of the syndrome, and the court's focus will be shifted from the child's best interests to the existence of PAS. As in Young v. Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1995), an attorney can make a strong argument for a change in custody based upon alienation of the child's affections from the noncustodial parent without bringing in evidence of the controversial PAS.

Change of Residence

Many practitioners insert requirements in their divorce decrees that custodial parents inform the noncustodial parents of any relocation plans. Such notification will give the noncustodial parent an opportunity to argue that the relocation is not in the child's best interests. See generally N. Roddy, "Stabilizing Families in a Mobile Society: Recent Case Law on Relocation of the Custodial Parent," 8 Divorce Litigation 141 (1996). Quite frequently, however, a custodial parent will ignore the notification requirement and relocate to a distant jurisdiction without informing the other parent of the move. Since a clandestine move to a distant location often injures the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent, courts often determine that the move constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying a change in custody.

A good example was provided by the case of In re Marriage of Clifford, 515 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa Ct.App.1994). In Clifford, the parties' divorce decree awarded custody of their two minor children to the mother. The decree also awarded reasonable visitation to the father. Approximately five months later, the mother moved from Des Moines, Iowa, to Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The mother did not provide the father with her new home address or telephone number until three or four months after the move. Subsequently, because the father's visitation became frustrated by the mother's actions, the father filed a motion for a change of custody. After considering the mother's failure to inform the father of her new location or telephone number, the court awarded a change of custody to the father. Id. at 561.

Likewise, in Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct.App.1995), the parties' marriage produced two daughters. The divorce decree awarded custody to the mother and liberal visitation to the father. The decree also stated that in the event that the mother moved away from Utah the father would be allowed 60 days' visitation each year. The decree further provided that the parties would openly communicate with each other concerning the children's best interests and take actions to enhance the relationship with the children and both parents. Approximately two years later, the mother sold her home and relocated to New Zealand. The mother did not inform the father of the move, and the father did not learn of the move until after the children and the mother left the United States. As a result, the children's access to their father was severely limited. Subsequently, the mother moved to Colorado, but only gave the father a business telephone number until she was required to give a personal number. Frustrated, the father filed a motion for a change in custody and visitation. Even after the father filed the motion, the mother continued to obstruct the father's access to the children. The trial court concluded that although the children had strongly bonded with the mother, it was in their best interests for the court to transfer custody to the father.

On appeal, the decision by the trial court to transfer custody was affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Utah specifically cited the fact that the mother had removed the children to a foreign country without notifying the father:

[O]ur review of the record indicates [the mother] has violated the terms of the divorce decree. For example, although [the mother] is correct in pointing out that the divorce decree explicitly contemplates her possible move to New Zealand or elsewhere outside of Utah, it certainly does not anticipate, let alone condone, removing the children without notifying the father. Such notification, although not explicitly required in the decree, is clearly within the scope of the decree's requirement that the couple "freely and openly communicate regarding actions to be taken in the best interests of the children."

Id. at 913-14. Hence, as stated by the court, a removal of a child to a distant jurisdiction by a custodial parent justifies a change of custody. Accord Chandler v. Chandler, 261 Ga. 598, 409 S.E.2d 203 (1991) (change of custody to father was warranted where mother violated divorce decree by taking child out of the state without notifying father); In re Marriage of Clifford, supra (custodial mother's move out of Iowa without notification to the father justified change of custody to father); Moon v. Moon, 795 S.W.2d 511 (Mo.Ct.App.1990) (change of custody was proper where mother removed children to Mexico without father's authorization).

In contrast, some courts have refused to change custody simply because a parent removed the child without notification to the other parent. For example, in In re Marriage of McDole, 67 Wash.App. 884, 841 P.2d 770 (1992), the parties' marriage produced one child. Shortly after the child's birth, the parties were divorced and the decree awarded primary residential custody to the mother. The decree also awarded liberal visitation to the father. Furthermore, although the decree did not enjoin the parties from removing the child from Walla Walla County, Washington, the court orally stated that the parties could not remove the child from Walla Walla County. Because the decree did not state this restriction, however, without notifying the father, the mother moved to Utah with the child. Upon a motion by the father, the court ordered the mother to provide a telephone number to the father. At first, the mother refused to provide a residential telephone number, but she later complied with the order. Then the court considered a motion by the father to change custody. A social worker testified that the move to Utah caused psychological damage to the child. The trial court concluded that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred and ordered a change of custody, and the mother appealed.

The Court of Appeals of Washington reversed the decision of the trial court to order a change of custody. The court of appeals noted that the only alleged grounds for a change in custody was the mother's move to Utah and her lack of cooperation with visitation. Because the court of appeals believed that the mother's move was not "in any way" detrimental to the child, the move to Utah without permission did not permit the court to order achange of custody. See also Fatemi v. Fatemi, 371 Pa.Super. 101, 537 A.2d 840 (1988) (father's removal of child to foreign country and other isolated violations of custody decree did not warrant a change of custody to the mother).

V. Conclusion

As the authority cited in this memorandum indicates, while obstruction of the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child will often lead to a change in custody, such a change is not guaranteed. Courts appear to recognize that the detriment to a child caused by occasional failures to turn a child over for visitation does not automatically require a change of custody. See Humphrey v. Humphrey, 888 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (no change of custody was warranted where mother failed to honor father's visitation rights on only one occasion). If, however, a custodial parent has developed a pattern of refusing to allow visitation or otherwise interfering with the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child, the court should award a change in custody. E.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 216 A.D.2d 627, 627 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1995) (modification of custody was justified where mother consistently violated court-ordered visitation and telephone contact).

In order to prevent a child's relationship with the noncustodial parent from deteriorating, certain provisions should be standard in every custody decree. First, every decree should require each person with a right to custody or visitation to foster the relationship between the child and other persons who have a right to custody or visitation. Second, every decree should state that persons who have custodial or visitation rights should not speak ill of another person who has custodial or visitation rights. Third, practitioners should consider placing restrictions on a custodial parent's right to relocate without informing the court or the noncustodial parent. Otherwise, similarly to the father in In re Marriage of McDole, supra, the noncustodial parent may surprisingly discover that the custodial parent has left the jurisdiction without a forwarding address.

These three provisions will not guarantee that no problems with custody or visitation will occur. Rather, a custodial parent who desires to destroy the relationship of the child with the noncustodial parent will succeed unless stopped. If, however, the above provisions are inserted into the decree, a violation of a specific provision could lead to a contempt citation. While not a panacea, the above three provisions may give the noncustodial parent the extra edge which he or she may need in a postdissolution custody proceeding. Furthermore, since the provisions encourage a strong relationship between both parents and the child, such provisions are generally in the child's best interests.

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